# The Power of Al to Disrupt Security Operations


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Cofounder & VP of Strategy

# Agenda

- Problem slide... ©
- Artificial Intelligence Ugh!
- Security Operations
- Aligning for the Future





## Voice of the Analyst Survey

Activity Rankings Across Perceptual Dimension

Enjoyment	Expertise	Value	Dynamic	Resources	Time
Hunting	Forensic	Response	Hunting	Hunting	Monitoring
Forensic	Hunting	Forensic	Forensic	Forensic	Intrusion
Intel	Intrusion	Intrusion	Intel	Intrusion	Shift Ops
Intrusion	Response	Hunting	Intrusion	Response	Response
Response	Intel	Intel	Response	Intel	Collaboration
Training	Proactive	Proactive	Proactive	Monitoring	Tools
Proactive	Training	Training	Collaboration	Proactive	Intel
Collaboration	Tools	Monitoring	Tools	Tools	Reporting
Monitoring	Monitoring	Collaboration	Training	Training	Training
Tools	Collaboration	Tools	Monitoring	Collaboration	Proactive
Shift Ops	Shift Ops	Reporting	Shift Ops	Reporting	Hunting
Reporting	Reporting	Shift Ops	Reporting	Shift Ops	Forensic

Voice of the Analyst Survey, Cyentia Institute



## Artificial Intelligence

## What does that even mean?



## Artificial Intelligence

# Machines that mimic cognitive functions such as learning, problem solving and decision-making.

- A new brand on what used to be called MATH
- Deep Learning = Neural Networks (1943) + image processing GPUs
- nAl means Narrow Al
- nAl = A → B, "Ability to learn or act intelligently" Andrew Ng

## Learning Software

## Data is meaningless without judgement

- Lab data is equivalent to "school learning"
- Labeled, enterprise, production data is equivalent to "experience"
- Artificially generated datasets are "lying" to the model
- Judgement = expertise (reasoning and heuristics)




## Uncertainty and Prediction

Probability Theory

- "... is just common sense reduced to calculation"
  - Dead French Mathematician

- But it really is more than that...





## Everything is a Distribution




The *most likely incident* is at the center of them all.



#### ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE – UGH!

## \* Possible States of the World



# Security Operations

Is deep in process and procedures designed to minimize human error!


Must change and must change quickly.


Is Al the answer?

#### **SECURITY OPERATIONS ON AI**

### Task & Process Automation

Start with blueprints







#### **SECURITY OPERATIONS ON AI**

## SIEM Rules are Highly Specific and Narrow

This analysis is derived from a complete list of SIEM rules boiled down into their most atomic form. Example below:

SIEM Rule	Category	Sub-category	Data Source	MSS	Customer 1	Decision Supported
Antivirus signatures out of date	Malware	Policy Violation	Endpoint			System Infected?
Multiple viruses detection on single system	Malware	Infection	Endpoint	MSS	Mature SOC	System Infected?
Mobile malware detected on executive BYOD device	Malware	Espionage	Mobile			System Infected?
Executable or large file downloads from uncategorized site	Malware	Exploit	Web Filter			System Infected?
Abnormal user agent	Malware	Infection	Web Filter			System Infected?
User clicked suspicious link	Malware	Phishing	Web Filter		Mature SOC	System Infected?
Distributed account scanning	Network Recon	Stealth	Authentication		Mature SOC	Network Compromised?
Port scan of critical internal system	Notwork Pocon	Scanning	Natwork Concor	MCC	Matura SOC	Network Compromised?
Internal scanning by unauthorize						Network Compromised?
IDS alerts from the same sou	inical Dulac	-250/20	f Total			etwork Compromised?
ibs dielts from the same soc						
Distributed port scanning	pical Rules	= 25 /o U	i iulai			twork Compromised?
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#### TOO MANY FACTORS TO CONSIDER

#### Rules and Queries

Telnet protocol used IRC port accessed

Security logs cleared by user

5 failed logins

Default account accessed

Malware not cleaned

Brute force attempted

SQL injection attempt



#### **LONG TAIL DECISION ANALYSIS**

### -vs- Robotic Decision Automation

#### **Network Intrusion**

- Network
- Attack signatures
- Perimeter & internal

#### **Endpoint Protection**

- Host-based agent
- Malware signatures
- User environment

#### **URL Filtering / Proxy**

- Internet browsing
- Suspicious connects
- Network chokepoint

#### **Endpoint Detection**

- Operating system
- All system activity
- Servers & users

#### **Signatures**

**Analytics** 

**Patterns** 

History

Context

**Assets** 

$$f(oldsymbol{ heta},oldsymbol{\lambda}) = \sum_{\mathbf{x}} \left( \prod_{\lambda_x:\, x\,\sim\,\mathbf{x}} \lambda_x \prod_{\mathbf{f}_i\sim\mathbf{x}} heta_{\mathbf{f}_i} 
ight)$$

Behaviors

Intelligence



# Aligning for the Future

Let's put these two back together again.



#### ALIGNING FOR THE FUTURE

## Match the Math to the Problem

#### **PROBLEM**

- NIDS false positive reduction
- Malware classification
- Behavioral baselines
- Recognition (signature, image)
- Anomalies, how malicious?
- Understand relationships
- Complicated problem...


#### **MATHEMATICS**

- K-Means clustering
- Bayesian filters
- Statistics
- Deep learning
- Anomaly detection
- Conditional probability
- Hybrid solution!



#### Aligning for the Future

## Human + Machine in Security Operations



## How this works...

#### From:

- 1. Subject matter expertise and experience
- 2. Careful definition of a fact
- 3. Problem solving, reasoning process
- 4. Initial judgements and labelled data
- 5. Cross-customer learning
- 6. Deeper questioning of the model
- 7. Improved inputs (data, arch., config.)

#### **Turned into:**

- 1. Relevant facts (evidence, features)
- 2. Single feature of a model (meaning)
- 3. Probabilistic models
- 4. Informed decision of a "rookie" model
- 5. Highly experienced decision (vs. human)
- 6. New useful information, optimal mix
- 7. Continuous improvement



#### ALIGNING FOR THE FUTURE

## Reference Architecture for Security Operations





"Monitoring for Bad"



"Managing Bad"



4:55 PM

# Thank You

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